Abstract. One drawback of the traditional KP-ABE is the limitation for expressing the hierarchical structure of attributes. In this paper, we firstly propose a fully secure Key-Policy Hierarchical Attribute-based encryption (KP-HABE). In KP-HABE, attribute is expressed by a vector in order to facilitate the indication of the hierarchical structure of attribute. The technique of composite order bilinear pairing and linear secret sharing scheme is used to build the KP-HABE scheme.
Introduction
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE), which has been presented by Sahai and Waters [1] , is an influential paradigm for embedding complex access policy into the encrypted data. Key -Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP -ABE) and Cipertext -Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP ABE) are two typical kinds of ABE schemes [2] . In KP -ABE, ciphertexts are associated with the attribute set and private keys are associated with the access policy, in CP -ABE, ciphertexts are associated with the access policy and private keys are associated with the attribute set.
Our contribution in this paper is multifold, we describe it in detail as follows. In traditional KP -ABE, all the distributions of private keys rely on the TA which results in the low performance of the system. To address this problem, we present the first fully secure Key-Policy Hierarchical AttributeBased Encryption. Technically speaking, we import the skill proposed by Boneh et al. [3] to express the hierarchical property of private keys, then, we utilize the Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) to split a master secret into multiple shares. Finally, we adopt the technique of Lewko and Waters [4] to "bind" the secret shares to the hierarchical private keys.
Composite Order Bilinear Groups
Let be a group generator and be the security parameter. Composite order bilinear groups [5] can be defined as:
, for which are three distinct primes, are cyclic groups with order and the group operation in is computable in polynomial time with respect to the secure parameter . A bilinear map is an efficiently computable map with the following properties:
Bilinearity: for all and , . Non-degeneracy:
such that has order in . Suppose that denotes the subgroup of order and denotes the subgroup of order . The orthogonality property of is defined as follows: for all it holds that , for which . We demonstrate why the above property holds: let and be a generator of . Then generates generates , and generates . Therefore, for some , we can express as:
Then we have:
Key-Policy Hierarchical Attribute-Based Encryption
A Key-Policy Hierarchical Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-HABE) includes five algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt and Delegate. : The algorithm takes the security parameter as input and it takes the public key PK and a master secret key MSK as output.
Encrypt( ,PK,S): The algorithm takes a message , the public key PK and an attribute set S as inputs. It takes the ciphertexts CT as output.
KeyGen (PK,MSK, ): The algorithm takes an access structure , the master secret key MSK and public key PK as inputs. It outputs a secret key for the access structure . Delegate : The algorithm takes public key PK, a secret key associated with the access structure , an attribute set of depth corresponding to the access structure , an access structure , an attribute set of depth corresponding to the access structure as inputs. It takes the secret key for the access structure as output. Decrypt(CT, ): The algorithm takes a ciphertext CT associated with the attribute set S, secret keys for access structure as input. If , it outputs ; otherwise, outputs .
Our KP-HABE Scheme
Given a group description , where . are groups of order , is a map:
. The attribute universe is . Our scheme consists of four algorithms, we demonstrate them as follows.
Setup . The algorithm takes the security parameter as input. Assume that the maximum depth of the attribute vector in our scheme is . The algorithm picks random generators , random elements and random group elements . It outputs . The master secret key is . KeyGen (PK,MSK, ). The algorithm takes an access structure (where is the secret sharing matrix with rows and columns, is the function mapping one row of to an attribute vector of depth ), the master key MSK and public key PK as inputs. The algorithm chooses secret vector where . Notice that is the secret to be shared. The algorithm evaluates the th shares of the secret as:
where indicates the th row of the access matrix . Recall that the maximum depth of the attribute vector is . For each from 1 to , the algorithm picks random elements:
Assume that the attribute vector associated with the row is , the algorithm uses a group element to express the attribute vector and computes:
Finally, the algorithm outputs the private keys as:
.
Delegate
: The algorithm takes public key PK, a secret key associated with the access structure , an attribute set of depth corresponded to the access structure , an access structure , an attribute set of depth corresponded to the access structure as inputs. Recall that, according to the definition 3, if holds, then for any attribute of depth in , it must exist and holds. Assume that the matrix has rows and matrix has rows. Let the given secret key be:
Then the algorithm can generate the key for through delegating the key of . For each from to , the algorithm chooses random elements:
For each attribute vector associated with the th row in the access matrix , it must exist prefix such that . Let the th row is the corresponded row of the attribute vector in the access structure , that is, . The algorithm generates the keys for the attribute vector as follows:
Finally, the algorithm outputs the secret keys:
Indeed, the algorithm transforms the expression of attribute vector from to and sets to be . Note that the keys generated in the delegate algorithm is identically distributed to keys generated by the way of directly calls the KeyGen algorithm.
Encrypt( ,PK,S). Given the set S of attribute vectors of depth , the algorithm encrypts a message with the following mechanism.
Let denote the number of attribute vectors in the set S, the algorithm picks random exponents , then it computes:
The algorithm outputs .
